Rulemaking vs. Democracy: Judging and Nudging Public Participation That Counts by Farina, Cynthia R. et al.
Cornell Law Library
Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository
Cornell e-Rulemaking Initiative Publications Centers and Programs
8-2014
Rulemaking vs. Democracy: Judging and Nudging
Public Participation That Counts
Cynthia R. Farina
Cornell Law School, crf7@cornell.edu
Mary J. Newhart
Cornell Law School, Cornell eRulemaking Initiative, mjn3@cornell.edu
Josiah Heidt
E-Government Fellow, Cornell eRulemaking Initiative
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/ceri
Part of the Administrative Law Commons
This Published Papers is brought to you for free and open access by the Centers and Programs at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Cornell e-Rulemaking Initiative Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital
Repository. For more information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Farina, Cynthia R.; Newhart, Mary J.; and Heidt, Josiah, "Rulemaking vs. Democracy: Judging and Nudging Public Participation That
Counts" (2014). Cornell e-Rulemaking Initiative Publications. Paper 17.
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/ceri/17
44 ELR 10670 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER 8-2014
An underlying assumption of many open government enthusiasts is that more public participation will necessarily lead to better government policymak-
ing: If we use technology to give people easier opportunities 
to participate in public policymaking, they will use these 
opportunities to participate effectively . Yet, experience thus 
far with technology-enabled rulemaking (e-rulemaking) 
has not confirmed this “if-then” causal link . Such causal 
assumptions1 include several strands: If we give people the 
opportunity to participate, they will participate . If we alert 
people that government is making decisions important to 
them, they will engage with that decisionmaking . If we 
make relevant information available, they will use that 
information meaningfully . If we build it, they will come . If 
they come, we will get better government policy .
This Article considers how this flawed causal reason-
ing around technology has permeated efforts to increase 
public participation in rulemaking . The observations and 
suggestions made here flow from conceptual work and 
practical experience in the Regulation Room project . Reg-
ulation Room is an ongoing research effort by the Cornell 
eRulemaking Initiative (CeRI), a multidisciplinary group 
of researchers who partner with the U .S . Department of 
Transportation (DOT) and other federal agencies .2 At the 
1 . Fallacies of this kind (sometimes referred to as “magical thinking”) refer 
to nonscientific causal reasoning, and can be associated with a number of 
cognitive biases (i .e ., mistakes human beings make in reasoning, evaluating, 
remembering, or other cognitive processes) and include attentional bias and 
confirmation bias . See Behavioral Law and Economics 1-10 (Cass Sun-
stein ed ., Cambridge University Press 2000), for an introduction to cogni-
tive biases .
2 . See Cornell eRulemaking Initiative (CeRI), http://www .lawschool .cor-
nell .edu/ceri/ (last visited Aug . 3, 2012) .
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core is an experimental online public participation plat-
form that offers selected “live” agency rulemakings .3 The 
goal is discovering how information and communication 
technologies (ICTs) can be used most effectively to engen-
der broader, better participation in rulemaking and similar 
types of policymaking .4
This Article begins by explaining how the belief that 
new ICTs would result in broadscale popular participation 
eclipsed the question “why is more public participation in 
rulemaking a good thing?” Perhaps democracies inevita-
bly conflate more participation with better government . 
However, treating the value of more participation as self-
evident has left us without guidance on how to value the 
new participation that technology brings, and on how to 
deploy technology to get the participation we really want . 
Part II analyzes the differences between how participation 
is valued in electoral democracy and in rulemaking . Part 
III discusses implications of these differences for designing 
rulemaking participation systems .
I. The Drive for E-Participation
Federal agencies have used emerging ICTs to increase 
public participation in rulemaking . Regulations .gov has 
enabled the public to view rulemaking documents online 
and added governmentwide online comment submission 
to the previous options of fax and e-mail, although observ-
ers have called for system improvements .5 The motivating 
3 . Reg . Room, http://www .regulationroom .org (last visited July 28, 2012) .
4 . See Cynthia R . Farina et al ., Rulemaking in 140 Characters or Less: Social 
Networking and Public Participation in Rulemaking, 31 Pace L . Rev . 382 
(2011) [hereinafter Rulemaking in 140 Characters] . The Planning Room 
(planningroom .org) will apply the technology and techniques developed to 
support public participation in rulemaking in a different complex policy 
environment: updating an agency’s strategic plan .
5 . E.g., Cynthia R . Farina, Comm . on the Status & Future of Fed . E-
Rulemaking, Achieving the Potential: The Future of Federal E-
Rulemaking (2008); Cary Coglianese et al ., Unifying Rulemaking Informa-
tion: Recommendations on the New Federal Docket Management System, 57 
Admin . L . Rev . 621 (2005) .
The full version of this Article was originally published as: Cynthia R 
Farina, Mary Newhart & Josiah Heidt, Rulemaking vs. Democracy: 
Judging and Nudging Public Participation That Counts, 2 Mich . J . 
Envtl . & Admin . L . 123 (2013) . It has been excerpted and updated 
with permission of Michigan Journal of Environmental and 
Administrative Law, Cynthia R. Farina, Mary Newhart, and Josiah 
Heidt. Please see the full article for complete footnotes and sources.
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Web 2 .0 idea is not simply that users make rather than 
retrieve content, but that “Web 2 .0 offers all users the 
same freedom to contribute .”6 Advocacy groups have used 
the Internet to mount membership “calls to action” for 
high profile rulemakings . Technology and participation 
are no longer linked, but fused, and technology becomes 
political . In this techno-political environment, participa-
tion is axiomatically good, and more participation is nec-
essarily better .
II. What Kind of Participation Should We 
Value?
Federal e-government leaders’ conviction that Web 2 .0 
would enable government to tap dispersed citizen knowl-
edge subsumed any more particularized assessment of 
how, in the complex and demanding policy environment 
of rulemaking, more public participation would add value . 
Without such reflective assessment, technology-enabled 
commenting often leads to increased participation that 
only expresses opinions or preferences without elaboration 
or deliberation . For example, calls to action launched by 
established advocacy organizations have resulted in mass 
e-mail comments that are numerous and duplicative .7 
While the incidence of mass commenting is low relative 
to the number of new rules proposed each year, when a 
rulemaking does prompt mass commenting the impact on 
the agency can be immense .8
Examining such mass e-mail campaigns, Professor Nina 
Mendelson found that “agency officials appear to be dis-
counting these [preference]-laden comments, even when 
they are numerous .”9 Rulemaking is not supposed to be a 
plebiscite .10 It would be troubling if the agency were mak-
ing decisions based on the numerical weight of outcome 
preferences .11 Mendelson takes on this conventional view 
with a challenging set of questions .12 Increasingly, we rec-
6 . Web 2.0: Characteristics, Wikipedia, http://en .wikipedia .org/wiki/
Web_2 .0#Characterstics (last modified Aug . 6, 2012 at 5:55 AM) (empha-
sis added) .
7 . See Stuart W . Shulman, The Case Against Mass E-Mails: Perverse Incentives 
and Low Quality Public Participation in the U.S. Federal Rulemaking, 1 
Pol’y & Internet 23, 34 fig . 4, 35 (2009) [hereinafter Case Against Mass 
E-Mails] .
8 . John M . Figueiredo, E-Rulemaking: Bringing Data to Theory at the Fed-
eral Communications Commission, 55 Duke L .J . 988-99 (2006); The Case 
Against Mass E-Mails, supra note 7, at 46 .
9 . Nina A . Mendelson, Rulemaking, Democracy, and Torrents of E-Mail, 79 
Geo . Wash . L . Rev . 1343 (2011) .
10 . See Rulemaking in 140 Characters, supra note 4, at 436-37 (describing “regu-
latory rationality” rulemaking requirements) .
11 . Some have expressed concern about e-rulemaking because it might push 
agencies toward plebiscitary decisionmaking . See, e.g., David Schlosberg & 
John S . Dryzek, Digital Democracy: Virutal or Real?, 115 Organ . & Env’t 
332 (2002); Bill Funk, The Public Needs a Voice in Policy, But Is Involv-
ing the Public in Rulemaking a Workable Idea?, CPRBlog, Ctr . for Pro-
gressive Reform (Apr . 13, 2010), http://progressivereform .org/CPRBlog .
cfm?idBlog=F74D5F86-B44E-2CBB-ED1507624B638 09E .
12 . Mendelson, supra note 9, at 1371-79 .
ognize that regulatory decisions are heavily preference- or 
value-laden, even when they also require use of scientific or 
other specialized knowledge .13 If this is so, why shouldn’t 
the agency take account of citizens’ value preferences? 
When choices among competing values must be made, 
government should be attending to citizens’ value prefer-
ences at least until they impinge on other values protected 
from majoritarian override . Even if agencies ought not 
give decisive weight to numbers of mass comments, why 
shouldn’t such participation count as evidence of values 
citizens want favored in regulatory decisionmaking?14 This 
argument challenges us to think more deeply about the 
relationship of rulemaking to democratic government and 
how the value of participation in each is related .
A. All Preferences Are Not Created Equal
Citizens’ preferences about public policy outcomes may be 
grounded in very different amounts and kinds of informa-
tion . The following typology, while oversimplified, captures 
differences in the information quality and deliberativeness 
of heuristic preference formation:
1. Spontaneous Preferences: The preferences a citi-
zen expresses when she has neither focused on the 
issue, nor been targeted by efforts to persuade her 
about the issue . Sometimes described as “top-of-the-
head”15 or “re-active”16—generally derived from the 
individual’s general knowledge, underlying value 
system, and worldview .
2. Group-Framed Preferences: Groups (like the Environ-
mental Defense Fund or National Rifle Association) 
can play a powerful role in the formation of citizens’ 
public policy preferences . They become important 
components of an individual’s civic identity and 
serve the valuable function of signaling when an issue 
“deserves” attention by those who share the group’s 
values .17 Mass communication campaigns rely on 
group-framed preferences .
13 . See, e.g., Emily Hammond Meazell, Super Deference, the Science Obsession, 
and Judicial Review of Agency Science, 109 Mich . L . Rev . 733, 735-36 
(2011); Stephen Zavestoski et al ., Democracy and the Environment on the 
Internet: Electronic Citizen Participation in Regulatory Rulemaking, 31 Sci, 
Tech, & Hum . Values 383 (2006); Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Rethinking 
Regulatory Democracy, 57 Admin . L . Rev . 411, 461-68 (2005) .
14 . Mendelson, supra note 9, at 1371-79 .
15 . E.g., James Fishkin & Robert Luskin, Experimenting With a Demoractic 
Ideal: Deliberative Polling and Public Opinion, 40 Acta Politica 284, 287 
(2005); John Zaller & Stanley Feldman, A Simple Theory of the Survey Re-
sponse: Answering Questions Versus Revealing Preferences, 36 Am . J . Pol . Sci . 
579 (1992) .
16 . “Reactive” is in contrast to “reflective .” E.g., Julie S . Weber et al ., Multi-
Format Notifications for Multi-Tasking, in Human-Computer Interac-
tion—Interact 2009, at 247 (2009) .
17 . E.g., Michael A . Hogg & Scott A . Reid, Social Identity, Self-Categorization, 
and the Communication of Group Norms, 16 Comm . Theory 7, 7-8, 18-21 
(2006) .
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3. Informed Preferences: These are preferences based on 
exposure to, and consideration of, reasonably full and 
accurate factual information and fairly representative 
arguments for both sides of the issue .
4. Adaptive Preferences:18 These are informed preferences 
modified by an assessment of the larger socio-political 
environment, legal and organizational constraints, 
and the claims of competing preferences . These are 
choices of the workable over the ideal . Voluntary 
conflict resolution processes often build consensus 
through adaptive preferences .
B. Preference Valuing in Democracy vs. Rulemaking
In electoral democracy, participation based on any of these 
preferences is valued . Voters are asked for outcomes, not 
reasons . Many voters are unaware of, or mistaken about, 
the record and positions of candidates for major office even 
on policy issues that they identify as important .19 In contrast, 
rulemaking is a process in which outcome legitimacy turns 
on a formally transparent process of reasoned deliberation . 
Agencies are expected to produce data-driven cost and risk 
analyses, to identify the facts they consider relevant and 
entertain claims that these facts are wrong or incomplete, 
to assess alternative approaches, to respond to questions 
and criticism, and to explain why their proposed solutions 
are the best choices within the bounds of what their statu-
tory authority says they can, must, or may not consider . 
Participation that counts in rulemaking requires reason-
giving, and this privileges some types of preferences . Citi-
zens must invest the time and cognitive resources required 
to form preferences that enable their engagement in rea-
soned decisionmaking . But informed participation comes 
at the cost of inclusiveness; not every interested member of 
the public will have resources to process the voluminous 
and legally, technically and linguistically complex infor-
mation produced by a rulemaking .
C. Are Value Preferences Different?
Mendelson posed the question, even if mass public 
comments have little weight generally, why shouldn’t 
these “value-focused comments”20 count when rulemak-
ing decisions depend on value choices? We believe the 
answer is that the preferences expressed in such mass 
18 . We use this term despite the Sen/Nussbaum critique of “adaptive prefer-
ences .” See Martha Nussbaum, Woman and Human Development 112-
66 (2000); Amartya Sen, Women, Technology and Sexual Division, 6 Trade 
& Dev . 195 (1985) . Adaptation can be a positive, as well as a negative, phe-
nomenon . E.g., Miriam Teschl & Flavio Comim, Adaptive Preferences and 
Capabilities: Some Preliminary Conceptual Explorations, 63 Rev . Soc . Econ . 
229 (2005) (arguing that the adaptive preference critique has a particular, 
narrow view on adaptation) .
19 . See Michael X . DelliCarpini & Scott Keeter, What Americans Know 
About Politics and Why It Matters 2663-64 (1996); Martin P . Wat-
tenberg, The Rise of Candidate-Centered Politics: Presidential 
Elections of the 1980s, at 123-26 (1991); Kate Kenski & Kathleen Hall 
Jamieson, Issue Knowledge and Perceptions of Agreement in the 2004 Presiden-
tial General Election, 36 Presidential Stud . Q . 243 (2006) .
20 . Mendelson, supra note 9, at 1362 .
comments may suffice for electoral democracy, but not 
for rulemaking, even when a rulemaking is heavily laden 
with value choices .
Importantly, the contrast between the electoral democ-
racy and rulemaking models of participation can be drawn 
even within the administrative process . Agency rulewriters, 
often career officials with substantive, scientific, technical, 
legal or economic expertise, typically draft rulemaking 
proposals, read and summarize comments, and prepare 
final rules . Their work is reviewed at various levels, within 
and outside of the agency, that are headed by presiden-
tial appointees who are susceptible to political oversight 
and media scrutiny . Additionally, significant rules must 
be cleared by the Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs (OIRA), whose job includes ensuring that the rule 
is consistent with the President’s priorities . A draft pream-
ble that merely describes the receipt of mass public com-
ments is enough to put politically attuned actors on notice 
that the rulemaking might draw the attention of White 
House staff, members of Congress, and the media .
Determining the extent to which review by these actors 
shapes the rule that emerges from “the agency” is noto-
riously difficult .21 It is implausible that mass public com-
ments are ignored by the agency’s political leadership and 
OIRA .22 Rather, the administration may simply be pur-
suing a set of value preferences at odds with preferences 
expressed by most of the mass commenters . For agency 
political leadership, it seems appropriate for mass pub-
lic comments to simply generate whatever pressure they 
can on Congress, the media, or competing power centers 
within the administration .
But what about at the rulewriter’s level, where reasoned 
decisionmaking is supposed to happen? Professor Peter 
Strauss has written of the culture of administrative legality, 
whose norms impel rulewriters to justify regulatory out-
comes on more than political preference .23 To the extent 
rulemaking is “democratic,” we expect it to be a delibera-
tive process, rather than an electoral one .24 Agencies are 
expected to acknowledge conflicting interests and values, 
thoughtfully consider solutions, and clearly explain why 
some interests and values ought to have priority over oth-
ers . This account of reasoned decisionmaking is an ideal 
rather than a reality . Still, the value of participatory inputs 
must be gauged by the process we expect the agency to 
engage in . By that measure, mass public comments will 
rarely deserve much value . Though the individuals submit-
21 . See Nina A . Mendelson, Disclosing “Political” Oversight of Agency Decision 
Making, 108 Mich . L . Rev . 1127, 1149-54 (2010) .
22 . Cf. William F . West, Administrative Rulemaking: An Old and Emerging Liter-
ature, 65 Pub . Admin . Rev . 655, 662 (2005) (describing public comments 
as “a fire alarm that alerts politicians to agency actions”); William F . West, 
Formal Procedures, Informal Processes, Accountability, and Responsiveness in 
Bureaucratic Policy Making: An Institutional Policy Analysis, 64 Pub . Admin . 
Rev . 66 (2004) (concluding that public comments inform political over-
seers of constituent views) .
23 . Peter L . Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”?: The President in Administrative 
Law, 75 Geo . Wash . L . Rev . 696 (2007) .
24 . “Deliberative” here signifies characteristics such as reflection, reasonably 
full information, and genuine engagement with interests and values of 
all stakeholders .
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ting comments through mass calls to action may genuinely 
hold the expressed preferences, and though those prefer-
ences may be relevant to the rulemaking, neither genuine-
ness nor broad relevance is sufficient to create comments of 
value to the agency .
First, an agency could not assume these comments are 
fairly representative of citizens’ preferences in general . Also, 
given the standard brief, conclusory mass-comment text 
these campaigns usually produce, the agency would not be 
able to tell if an individual commenter holds informed or 
adaptive preferences . Instead, the agency must assume that 
the preferences: (i) are based on incomplete, perhaps erro-
neous, information; (ii) have not taken account of com-
peting arguments, interests, and policy considerations; and 
(iii) have not considered the workability or acceptability of 
regulatory outcomes more nuanced than absolute accep-
tance or rejection of the values asserted .
Thus, a reasonable agency would assume that mass 
comments suffer from the kinds of fundamental defects in 
information and judgment that would (justifiably) prompt 
judicial reversal were such flaws found in the agency’s own 
decisionmaking . Why would we want government deci-
sionmakers to attend to such flawed preferences?25 More-
over, would mass public commenters maintain the same 
preferences were they to have more complete information? 
The reasonable agency simply could not know .
III. Designing for Public Participation That 
Counts
Unpacking the statement “Rulemaking is not a plebi-
scite” in this way helps us answer the question identi-
fied at the outset: “Why is more public participation a 
good thing in rulemaking?” More public participation 
in rulemaking is not a good thing . Rather, the goal of a 
Rulemaking 2 .0 system26 should be more participation 
that satisfies three conditions:
1 . Participation by stakeholders and interested mem-
bers of the public who have traditionally been under-
voiced in the rulemaking process (Who)
2 . Participation that takes the form of germane “situ-
ated knowledge” and informed or adaptive prefer-
ences (What)
3 . Participation in rulemakings in which the existence 
of the first two conditions can reasonably be pre-
dicted to exist, and the value is reasonably likely to 
outweigh the costs of getting the desired participa-
tion (When)
25 . Cf. David Hudson & Jennifer VanHeerde-Hudson, “A Mile Wide and an 
Inch Deep”: Surveys of Public Attitudes Towards Development Aid, 4 Int’l J . 
Dev . Educ . & Global Learning 5 (2012) (arguing that surveys regarding 
global poverty are unreliable because they fail to control for knowledge-
levels and perceptions of aid effectiveness) .
26 . Rulemaking 2 .0 is a second-generation e-rulemaking system that employs 
Web 2 .0 information and communication technologies .
In this section, we explain these conditions and offer 
specific design principles that follow from them . Impor-
tantly, here we focus exclusively on participation by “the 
public .” Different design strategies would attend Rulemak-
ing 2 .0 systems targeting other groups such as non-affili-
ated experts .
A. Recognizing the Knowledge in the People
The logic of crowdsourcing27 may be compelling, but we 
believe it cannot be the guide for a Rulemaking 2 .0 sys-
tem . A goal to get more participation may result in many 
additional comments, but there is no guarantee these com-
ments will contain valuable information for the agency . 
Instead, we would frame the goal as getting more informed 
participation, particularly in the kinds of rulemakings that 
need what historically silent voices can add .
Many rulemakings do not need more public participa-
tion . The topics are too specialized, technical, or narrow to 
generate public interest or the affected stakeholder groups 
are already participating in the conventional process .28 
Still, there are rulemakings in which it is possible to iden-
tify groups of individuals or entities who will be directly 
affected by the regulation but who have not historically 
participated in the conventional process .
Our experience on Regulation Room reveals that in 
these types of rulemakings, historically “silent” stakehold-
ers can bring “situated knowledge” that the agency itself 
may not possess . Additionally, organizations purporting 
to represent these stakeholders may not sufficiently convey 
the full complexity of individuals’ situated knowledge . By 
situated knowledge, we mean information about impacts, 
problems, enforceability, contributory causes, unintended 
consequences, etc. that is known by the commenter because of 
lived experience in the complex reality into which the proposed 
regulation would be introduced . We discuss situated knowl-
edge in more detail elsewhere,29 but here are conclusions 
drawn from two Regulation Room rulemakings:
1. Situated knowledge can reveal and explore tensions and 
complexities within what may otherwise appear a uni-
tary set of interests.
2. Sometimes, situated knowledge identifies contribu-
tory causes that may not be within the agency’s regu-
latory authority but could affect the impact of new 
regulatory measures.
3. Sometimes, situated knowledge reframes the regulatory 
issues.
Situated knowledge is often conveyed through stories . 
Stories played a central role in a Regulation Room discus-
27 . “Crowdsourcing” is simply a method of distributed problem solving: issuing 
a call to a group for solutions .
28 . Our experiential base is discussion over the course of two years with DOT 
and other agencies that was aimed at identifying suitable rules for Regula-
tion Room .
29 . See Cynthia R . Farina et al ., Knowledge in the People: Rethinking the Value of 
Public Participation in Rulemaking, 47 Wake Forest L . Rev . 1185 (2012) .
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1.A. Rulemakings for expanded public 
participation efforts should be selected with 
care, to identify those in which dispersed, 
situated knowledge is both likely to exist 
and practicable to obtain.
As long as Regulations .gov provides the opportunity for 
everyone to comment on all rules, there is no legal rea-
son why the agency cannot be selective in the rules that it 
also offers through a Rulemaking 2 .0 system . That said, 
the actual selection of good candidates for expanded public 
participation can be problematic: Agency rulewriters tend 
to be over-quick to dismiss the need for more participa-
tion, while e-government leaders seem over-quick to insist 
that more participation could always help . Asking the fol-
lowing questions can help identify rulemakings where the 
enhanced participation opportunities of a Rulemaking 2 .0 
system are likely to add value:
1. Are there identifiable types of stakeholders that do not 
customarily or effectively participate in the rulemaking 
process or whose only participation is via representative 
organizations? Examples of such stakeholders from 
a Regulation Room rule on airline passenger rights 
included airline flight crews, gate agents, and indi-
vidual air travelers .
2. Are these types of stakeholders likely to have useful situ-
ated knowledge? For example, women of childbearing 
age arguably represent a distinct stakeholder group 
in mercury pollution rulemakings because of mer-
cury’s impacts on fetal development . But what could 
such stakeholders add by way of situated knowledge 
germane to setting emission limits? By contrast, park 
rangers might be able to contribute to rulemakings 
on restricting vehicle access to underdeveloped areas 
by particularizing benefits and harms, and improv-
ing workability of possible restrictions .
3. Is it reasonably possible to convey the information these 
stakeholders need to form informed or adaptive prefer-
ences that ought to be given weight in deliberative deci-
sionmaking? The NPRM, draft Regulatory Impact 
Assessment, and other documents provide informa-
tion, but their audience is lawyers, sophisticated enti-
ties, and courts . Consider the difficulty of providing 
reasonably complete and balanced information about 
adjusting mercury pollution limits in a form useful to 
laypeople; compare this to the far simpler analogous 
task in the airline passenger rights rulemaking .
Even if the selection process is imperfect, the alterna-
tive (i .e ., acting as if all rules would benefit from expanded 
public participation) is worse, for it heightens the risk that 
Rulemaking 2 .0 merely fobs citizens off with the shadow 
of engagement, rather than making it possible for them to 
meaningfully participate in self-government .
sion of a proposed DOT regulation on requirements for the 
use of electronic time management systems by commercial 
motor vehicle (CMV) operators . There, drivers shared sto-
ries revealing that their opposition to the proposed rule was 
rooted in concerns about the counterproductive inflexibil-
ity of such systems . Several truckers described occasions 
when driving with these systems had forced them to stop 
when close to home, or to pull over in an unsafe location, 
because unexpected traffic or weather conditions had spent 
all their legal driving time . While stories of this kind may 
not often radically shift agency thinking, they can provide 
relevant contextual information that could help the agency 
understand more fully the impact its proposal is likely to 
have “on the ground .”30
B. Principles of Rulemaking 2.0 Design
Several principles of participation system design flow from 
this conception of when more public participation might 
benefit the rulemaking process . The idea is not to have a 
Rulemaking 2 .0 participation platform displace first gen-
eration e-rulemaking systems; rather, the focus is on when 
and how additional Web 2 .0 outreach and content creation 
technologies should be deployed .
Principle 1. No Bread and Circuses31
A democratic government should not actively facilitate 
public participation that it does not value . Agencies cannot 
simply ignore mass comments; given the strong organiza-
tional interests such campaigns serve irrespective of any 
rulemaking impact, mass public commenting will likely 
continue . Agencies understand, however, both the par-
ticipation that matters to the process in general and the 
amount of effort needed to participate effectively in a par-
ticular rulemaking . For government to solicit new partici-
pants without providing adequate support, or to hold out 
participation methods that are easy but have little value, is 
political showmanship, not open government .
The degree of purposeful participation design called for 
by the “No Bread and Circuses” principle is a counterweight 
to the “all-participation-has-value” philosophy instantiated 
in Web 2 .0 . This principle requires intentionality when 
selecting participation opportunities and methods:
30 . Because conventional rulemaking discourse takes a more objective form, the 
personalized and narrative forms may interfere with the agency’s ability to 
“hear” the knowledge conveyed . See id.
31 . “Bread and circuses,” traced to Roman satirist Juvenal, refers to the strategy 
of Roman officials currying favor through free food and entertainment, thus 
debasing democracy by discouraging the difficult work of meaningful politi-
cal involvement .
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1.B. Only participation methods likely to lead 
to valuable participatory outputs should be 
included in a Rulemaking 2.0 system.
Web 2 .0 facilitates crowdsourcing by prominently encour-
aging users to vote, rate, and rank content . Voting, rating, 
and ranking are frequently part of Web 2 .0 participation 
platforms now offered to agencies because they are low-
effort and highly scalable . Rulemaking, however, is not like 
rating consumer products . Participant voting, rating, and 
ranking has no place in a Rulemaking 2 .0 system unless 
use of such participation methods is affirmatively justified by 
the designer . Here are situations in which justification could 
be found:
1. Effectiveness of consumer information proposals. 
Although low-thought spontaneous preferences gen-
erally have no rulemaking value, there are exceptions . 
For example, Congress required DOT to provide 
consumers information on how tire choice could 
affect automobile energy efficiency . A rulemaking 
sought comment on which label designs most effec-
tively informed consumers .32 Here, voting or ranking 
seems desirable .
2. To nudge more useful forms of participation. Research 
has shown that inducing people to take initial steps 
in a task or process can create investment in com-
pleting it .33 Low-effort and familiar acts like voting 
might be used to encourage the more effortful par-
ticipation of informed commenting .34
Principle 2. Abandon the Equal Treatment Norm
The equation of government fairness and neutrality with 
equal treatment is engrained in our political culture . How-
ever, adopting a single model of outreach and information 
for all is the regulatory equivalent of forbidding rich and 
poor alike to sleep under bridges . Agencies are understand-
ably risk-averse about any departure from conventional 
rulemaking practice that might open them to judicial 
reversal . Nonetheless, a Rulemaking 2 .0 system will not 
significantly broaden meaningful public participation 
unless both outreach and information efforts are tailored 
to the needs of new potential participants .
2.A. They will not come just because you build it, 
or even just because you tell them about it.
Getting new participants into rulemaking requires inform-
ing novices that rulemaking is happening, they have a right 
32 . Tire Fuel Efficiency Consumer Information Program, 74 Fed . Reg . 29542 
(proposed June 22, 2009) (to be codified at 49 C .F .R . §575) .
33 . See John W . Atkinson & David Birch, The Dynamics of Achievement-Orient-
ed Activity, in Motivation and Achievement 271 (J .W . Atkinson & J .O . 
Raynor eds ., 1974) .
34 . Cf. B .J . Fogg, Persuasive Technology: Using Computers to Change 
What We Think and Do 34-37 (2003) (describing “tunneling” design as a 
form of guided persuasion) .
to participate, and they should exercise that right . Publica-
tion in the Federal Register performs these functions for 
sophisticated stakeholders, but not for traditionally under-
voiced stakeholders . Getting newcomers to participate 
requires deliberate outreach that (i) is targeted to where 
such stakeholders or interested persons get information, 
(ii) employs media that they are accustomed to, and (iii) 
explains what is going on in terms that make clear why 
they should care .
This kind of targeted “social marketing”35 will not be 
easy for agencies steeped in the equal-treatment norm . 
Admittedly, there is a fine line between targeted motiva-
tional outreach and taking sides; but it is hardly clear that 
it is inappropriate to imply to the beneficiaries of proposed 
regulation that their interests are likely different from those 
of regulated entities, and urge them to speak up for them-
selves in the public comment process . We cannot be sure 
that a reviewing court, also steeped in the equal-treatment 
norm, would not consider targeted outreach reversible 
error . It would appear difficult, however, for sophisticated 
commenters to demonstrate actual harm . Moreover, it 
seems perverse to fault an agency charged with regulating 
for the public good for soliciting participation from those 
likely to benefit from its rulemaking .
2.B. Information must be tailored to different 
participant needs.
Reasonably balanced information about the problem the 
agency is addressing, limits on its authority, and the rel-
evant factual and policy arguments involved is probably 
the most important condition for valuable participation . 
Yet the potential participants that we most want to bring 
into the process are the least likely to obtain such informa-
tion from current rulemaking materials . The conventions 
of the NPRM have been shaped by the analytic demands 
of statute and Executive Order, risk-aversion in the face of 
judicial reversal, and the nature and capacity of sophisti-
cated stakeholders . These materials simultaneously assume 
a great deal of knowledge and overwhelm the intelligent lay 
reader with information .
Regulation Room uses a number of information re-
packaging strategies to create a series of “issue posts” 
that present the important aspects of the proposed rule 
in relatively manageable segments and fairly plain lan-
guage . We “layer” information so participants who seek 
more detail can readily access the original text, while 
those who want more help can get it through a glossary 
of unfamiliar terms and separate pages explaining the 
regulatory background . The more fundamental problem 
for agencies is the idea of creating a second text, parallel 
to the NPRM, that is shorter, simpler in language, and 
set up to facilitate discussion by laypeople . Would any 
variance in content between the formal version and “the 
people’s version” create grounds for challenge? One pos-
35 . See Matthew Wood, Marketing Social Marketing, 2 J . Soc . Marketing 94 
(2012) .
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sibility for managing this risk is to include a “people’s ver-
sion” in the NPRM itself, following the formal version . 
Any variance should then be treated no differently than if 
any other two parts of the NPRM seemed ambiguous or 
inconsistent: commenters have the chance to ask and the 
agency has the chance to clarify .
2.C. To enable meaningful new participation, 
there may be no substitute for human 
assistance.
Effective participation in rulemaking is hard . The volume 
and complexity of materials, even with tailored infor-
mation, makes it difficult for newcomers to articulate 
informed or adaptive preferences . For situated knowledge, 
participants need enough understanding of the context 
and issues to recognize which aspects of their experience 
are applicable, and they may require help communicating 
so that relevance and value are apparent .
In parallel to the role of facilitators in offline civic 
engagement settings, using a skilled moderator online can 
help foster norms of deliberative discourse, aid those with 
less participatory experience in contributing to the dis-
cussion, and constructively manage conflicts . Regulation 
Room uses trained and supervised law students as facilita-
tive moderators; our experiences have shown that human 
moderation is essential in engaging undervoiced stakehold-
ers and interested citizens . Currently, the level of citizen 
familiarity with effective participation is too low to expect 
newcomers to participate usefully without additional help . 
Because committing moderators for significant time is 
costly, we emphasize careful selection of rules, i .e ., deter-
mining when the anticipated value from new participants 
is reasonably likely to outweigh the costs . Further, we also 
recommend using facilitators from outside the responsible 
agency to avoid perception of the moderator as censoring, 
lacking genuine commitment, or becoming defensive in 
the face of criticism .36
Principle 3. Means Should Change; Ends Should Not
The design of Rulemaking 2 .0 systems should be a 
continuing, mindful effort to strike the balance, well-
recognized by offline democratic deliberation theorists 
and practitioners, between “more” and “better”—that 
is, between inclusiveness and what Robert Dahl called 
“enlightened understanding .”37
36 . E.g., Scott Wright, Government-Run Online Discussion Fora: Moderation, 
Censorship and the Shadow of Control, 8 Brit . J . Pol . & Int’l Rel ., 550, 
556 (2006) . A very apt analogy from existing regulatory processes is the 
procedure for negotiated rulemaking .
37 . Robert Dahl, A Democratic Dilemma: System Effectiveness Versus Citizen Par-
ticipation, 109 Pol . Sci . Q . 23, 30 (1994); see also James S . Fishkin, When 
the People Speak: Deliberative Democracy and Public Consultation 
32-64 (2009) .
3.A. Do not try to make participation easy; 
try to make opportunities for meaningful 
participation available to everyone.
Low-effort participation tends to be worth about as much 
as it costs . Rather, the purpose of Rulemaking 2 .0 systems 
should be on making it possible for the broadest range of 
citizens to engage meaningfully in policy decisions that 
affect them . The focus on increasing opportunity, rather 
than participation, reminds designers of the agency of citi-
zens . The designer’s responsibility is to create the best envi-
ronment for users of different ages, education levels, and 
socio-economic circumstances to recognize, understand, 
and effectively participate in rulemaking . The designer 
should search for effective ways to alert, inform, educate, 
motivate, and support new participants, and should reflect 
on criticisms and suggestions of outsiders .
3.B. Measures of success should align with what 
the system is trying to achieve.
Quantitative metrics—how many “hits,” visitors, page 
views, comments, etc .—are seductive . They can give 
designers useful information, and we regularly use and 
report them in Regulation Room . But, if more is not the 
same as better, then success can’t be defined by numbers .
The problem—to which we confess no satisfactory solu-
tion—is what metrics should be used instead . What seem-
ingly is required is some measure of comment quality that 
can compare comments from different participation meth-
ods, moderator interventions, etc . Difficulty in developing 
a solution led us to question more fundamentally how to 
conceptualize the value that inexperienced stakeholders 
and interested citizens can be expected to bring to the pro-
cess . At this point, our principal contribution is a warn-
ing: Just as system designers should not encourage forms 
of participation that have no value, so success should not 
be judged by metrics that do not in fact measure the value 
Rulemaking 2 .0 systems seek to add .
IV. Conclusion
Here we have challenged builders of civic engagement sys-
tems to reject the assumption, common in both Web 2 .0 
design and open-government thinking, that more partici-
pation is better . Instead, we have argued, responsible e-par-
ticipation design begins with the hard question of what 
types of public participation are (and should be) valued in 
the particular policymaking context .
The question is hard because the answer will often be 
kinds of participation that are more informed and thought-
ful, and hence more effortful and rare, than the participation 
that we accept in electoral democracy and that is enabled 
by popular Web 2 .0 mechanisms . For this reason, those 
who build and those who choose to use Rulemaking 2 .0 
platforms must be prepared to resist the pressure to facili-
tate cheap and easy participation .
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Design that supports and nudges citizens toward rea-
sonably informed participation in complex public policy-
making is undeniably difficult and resource-intensive . But 
the alternative is deceptive and irresponsible . There is no 
such thing as neutral design .
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